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Arid and semi-arid lands comprise 84% of Kenya’s land, characterised by low and
erratic rainfall, and increasing human and animal population. The study sought to
determine producers’ willingness to pay for protection of unique terroir-based
agri-food products from semi-arid lands as geographical indications. The sample
products comprised two commodities: mangoes from lower Eastern region of
Kenya and goats from Baringo in the North Rift region. Using random parameters
logit model speciﬁcation, choice experiments were used to elicit the producers’
willingness to pay for attributes related to design of geographical indications (GI)
for agricultural products in Kenya. Mango producers attached greater value to
having minimum guaranteed payments for their products and receiving price
information before the start of the season. Goat producers attached higher value to
where to sell the produce as well as use of collective marketing. The producers
therefore view GIs as a means to reduce market failures. GIs can enhance
collective participation of producers in the semi-arid regions in delimiting the
production region responsible for the unique characteristics; hence increase value.e01218
lished by Elsevier Ltd. This is an open access article under the CC BY-NC-ND license
y-nc-nd/4.0/).
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governance through GI framework that can limit parallel protection groups of the
same product in the same region.
Keywords: Agriculture, Economics1. Introduction
Unlike high and medium potential agricultural lands where intensive production can
result in increased productivity, semi-arid lands are fragile ecosystems, characterised
by low and often erratic rainfall. At least 84% of Kenya is comprised by arid and
semi-arid lands with limited cultivation of crops (GoK, 2010). Considering they
constitute the bulk of agricultural land, and with increased pressure on and subdivi-
sion of the high and medium potential lands, management of the semi-arid lands is of
importance to food security as well as economic development of the country. Sus-
tainable agriculture from these regions needs to emanate from carefully selected
high value products.
The Agricultural Sector Development Strategy (2010e2020) underscores the fact
that although the semi-arid lands are fragile, the potential of the existing crops
and livestock sub-sectors in the regions remains hugely untapped, thereby subjecting
the producers to low productivity and prices, and consequently low incomes and
poor livelihoods (GoK, 2010). The regions do have products that derive their unique
qualities from the geographical regions of production and, in some cases, the cultural
way of the people (for example the Baringo goats). Producers have the opportunity
to exploit these terroir-based characteristics through use of geographical indications
(GI). These can in turn provide them with additional economic, social and ecological
beneﬁts contributing to sustainable environmental management that ensures the
longevity of the quality and reputation. It is this quality and reputation that con-
sumers are increasingly seeking information about and are willing to pay a premium
to access (Tregear and Giraud, 2011).
Apple mangoes from the lower Eastern region of Kenya are reputed to be sweeter
and juicier due to the interaction of the existing geographical and climatic condi-
tions. Makueni County is the largest producer of apple mangoes in the country
(ABD, 2011). Whereas these mangoes do not necessarily attract higher prices in
the local and urban markets, traders usually mix them with those from other regions
and sell them as though they are all from lower Eastern e hence consumers are not
always assured of the quality and source of the mangoes. Goats from speciﬁc regions
in Baringo County are reputed to be naturally salty. These tend to attract higher pri-
ces than those from other regions. According to a focus group discussion, cattle and
goat producers from other regions in the same County often take their livestock toon.2019.e01218
ors. Published by Elsevier Ltd. This is an open access article under the CC BY-NC-ND license
censes/by-nc-nd/4.0/).
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increased immunity and better meat quality.
In seeking quality and reputation, consumers are not per se interested in the
geographical region of origin as they are in the geographical attribute present in
the commodity of preference (Menapace and Moschini, 2012). The study by
Menapace and Moschini (2012) shows that GI certiﬁcation improves the producers’
ability to use reputation as a means of assuring consumers of product quality. This
reduces the cost of reputation building as consumers receive more information on the
product and the producers are aware of what the consumers seek and are willing to
pay. Since the mango and goats described above already have pre-existing reputa-
tion, additional costs would mainly be on establishing and enforcing the rules gov-
erning participation, production, marketing and management of the ecosystem
providing the desired geographical attribute. All producers in the production region
would be eligible to join with little or no rivalry existinge a club-good characteristic
(Benavente, 2010).
Buchanan (1965) introduced the theory of clubs, also calling it the theory of collec-
tive membership. Buchanan argues that the utility an individual derives from a good
is dependent on the number of people sharing in the beneﬁts. Therefore, the aspect of
size of group is an important consideration when determining the utility derived. The
theory of clubs, also called the theory of optimal exclusion and of inclusion, further
cautions of the problem of free-riding, and hence raising the question of cost of
membership and of exclusion. If individuals perceive that they can beneﬁt without
being members, they will be more reluctant to pay for the good or service. Geograph-
ical indications possess public good characteristics, in as far as the quality of the
good is determined by the unique characteristics of the geographical region of pro-
duction. However, GI have club good characteristics due its collective nature and the
restriction of the production region.
Just like club goods, GIs provide collective membership in ownership of the reputa-
tion of the product. There is little or no rivalry and participation is voluntary. How-
ever, whereas club goods imply ﬁnite membership (congestible), with those not able
to join being able to form a similar club, geographical indications, as described,
encompass all members within the production region that exhibits the described
quality in a product, on condition that the members adhere to the jointly developed
codes-of-practice. This relates to the inﬁnitely large membership, characteristic of
public goods making GI semi-public goods or common poor resources as described
by Saunders (2014). Therefore, unlike club goods, having diﬀerent groups of pro-
ducers in the same region registering the same product with GI separately is not
possible. If allowed, having one unique product registered by several groups in
the same region would introduce anti-competition practices and rivalry. This hence
leaves the option of GI protection with congestion (Benavente, 2010).on.2019.e01218
ors. Published by Elsevier Ltd. This is an open access article under the CC BY-NC-ND license
censes/by-nc-nd/4.0/).
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toring, the congestion is likely to lead to decreased prices, and possibly quality of
the product, as described in the club theory (Buchanan, 1965; Saunders, 2014).
How this aspect of exclusion and ﬁniteness of membership is handled is important
and especially in semi-arid regions where land is already supporting increasingly
large human and animal populations. In these regions, poverty levels are high,
and due to the prevailing weather conditions, there is the additional challenge of
high product perishability.
The codes of practice, and the new marketing structure, should therefore provide
producers with an opportunity to beneﬁt from GI protection without over-
exploiting the fragile ecosystem. Eﬀective development and enforcement of the sus-
tainable codes of practice are also necessary to provide guidance and restrictions of
population and practices in goat management (Baringo) and apple mango trees man-
agement (Makueni). The assumed natural outcome would be controlled goats pop-
ulation and number of apple mangoes trees, in a way that is environmentally
sustainable. In addition to this enforcement, the producers can hence derive greater
beneﬁts by providing near complete quality information and homogenous products
to the consumers who are willing to pay a premium price for the products.
The other distinction of GI protection that is important for the semi-arid lands arises
from the fact that unique products pre-exist before their registration, complete with
commercial relations and distribution channels. However, for most small-scale prod-
ucts, the producers are price-takers and hence beneﬁt the least from the consumer
prices. GI protection has the capacity to provide producers more power in setting
the price and collective reputation of the product, which in turn could distort the ex-
isting channels or the characteristics of the relationships (Rangnekar, 2004). It is
therefore imperative that such protection should provide extra beneﬁts to the pro-
ducers worth the shift in the distribution channels and the eﬀort in creating or adapt-
ing new trust relationships. It should also provide near-seamless resolving of any
collective action problems that may arise, especially considering that collective mar-
keting has not been strong among both the mango and goat producers.
Another important consideration revolves around the voluntary nature of GIs,
another characteristic of club goods. Since participation is voluntary, the GI protec-
tion would need to be speciﬁc on the behaviour of producers not willing to join in
providing the collective reputation of the product (Benavente, 2010). Can such pro-
ducers still produce the same product, away from (or within) the given codes of prac-
tice and sell it outside the production region? The codes of practice provide
minimum quality standards but do not necessarily serve as a barrier to entry
(Rouviere and Soubeyran, 2008). In the event that producers do not derive suﬃcient
value from a GI protection, it is likely they may opt out of the protection, but still ﬁnd
alternative ways to free-ride on the reputation of the GI products.on.2019.e01218
ors. Published by Elsevier Ltd. This is an open access article under the CC BY-NC-ND license
censes/by-nc-nd/4.0/).
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products have been registered yet. The potential for exploitation of GI protection has
been on the increase not only in Kenya but also in Africa. Several products have
been registered including Rooibos tea (South Africa Trademark), Harrar and Yirga-
cheﬀe coﬀee (Ethiopia Trademarks), Oku white honey (Cameroon GI), Argane oil
(Morocco GI) and Zanzibar cloves as GI. The potential is growing, providing Ken-
yan producers an opportunity to exploit the natural occurring geographical condi-
tions for their beneﬁt.
Like any other registration, GI protection for agri-foods from semi-arid lands of
Kenya would accord the producers beneﬁts while at the same time resulting in costs
to be incurred for development and maintenance. Some of the envisaged costs and
beneﬁts that may accrue in the semi-arid lands of Kenya are summarised on Table 1.
These costs are incurred in order to reduce substitutability of the products in the mar-
kets and in turn accord producers increased value of their products and region of pro-
duction (Galtier et al., 2013).
In light of these arguments governing protection of terroir-based unique products
from semi-arid lands with GIs, the objective of the study was to determine agricul-
tural producers’ willingness to pay for geographical indications-attributes in Kenya.
The study was based on choice experiments and was conducted among producers of
two diﬀerent products primarily grown in ASAL regions and are characterised with
having unique taste qualities that are perceived to be linked to the region of produc-
tion. These are Baringo Goats, reputed to be naturally salty, and Makueni Apple
mangoes, reputed to be sweeter than other apple mangoes grown in other regions
in the country, as described earlier. These products are important sources of liveli-
hood among the study population (Musungu, 2008). The production potential in
both the livestock and fruit subsectors remains hugely unexploited with producers
mainly selling raw products to the market.2. Methodology
2.1. Empirical approach e application of choice experiments
Geographical indications are an intangible asset. As an intellectual property right, GI
is a non-monetary resource, not physical in nature but having special rights and priv-
ileges attached to it, claimed legally only in the future. Due to their non-monetary
nature and the fact that the concept is relatively new in Kenya, use of choice exper-
iments was considered appropriate to estimate value that would accrue to producers
if they registered and marketed their unique products as geographical indications.
The theoretical framework of choice modelling is based on the Lancaster consumer
theory (Lancaster, 1966) and is consistent with the random utility maximisation the-
ory (Hanley et al., 2001; Louviere et al., 2003; McFadden and Zarembka, 1974). Theon.2019.e01218
ors. Published by Elsevier Ltd. This is an open access article under the CC BY-NC-ND license
censes/by-nc-nd/4.0/).
Table 1. Summary of potential costs and beneﬁts that may accrue from GI
protection in semi-arid lands of Kenya.
A. Costs
1. Participatory demarcation of exact physical boundaries lead by producers, taking care (i) not to
exclude eligible producers; (ii) to embrace the natural and socio-cultural dynamics of the region; and
(iii) to be clear how to deal with free-riders. This may take several years, but is essential to provide the
product speciﬁcity
2. Establishing the codes of practice for each product which provides criteria and standards that ensure
quality, safety and product uniformity
3. Invest in information-education of actors at local level including the supply chain and consumers
4. Establish control and certiﬁcation fees, which requires streamlining of the government agencies in
charge to avoid multiple deductions
5. Costs related to marketing and promoting the GI product - taking care not to face opposition from
current supply chain. They can provide market suitable GI market linkages
6. Investment in infrastructure and production for any adjustments needed (e.g. abattoir for goat meat etc
e if at County level, need to diﬀerentiate the meat from diﬀerent regions)
7. Adaptation to rules, methods, and speciﬁcations through collective action and group coordination -
change of mindset is required; and often times this may be a multi-sectoral undertaking
8. Vigilance and maintaining protection - against misuse of the name and quality of the product, which is
already rampant. Dependent on potential beneﬁts perceived by the GI owners
9. Increased input costs since producers have to maintain certain standards of inputs as well
10. Increased investment by richer producers at the expense of the native land owners (esp poorer ones)
B. Potential beneﬁts
1. Improved market access for the producers
2. Increased value/proﬁtability, due to product quality but also due to economies of scale brought about
by collective action and reduced transaction costs along supply chain
3. Assurance of qualities or characteristics and authenticity for the consumers
4. Traceability of product source is increased for consumers
5. Complementary eﬀect on other products from the region from the reputation as well as from improved
environmental management
6. Increased land values
7. Induced tourism
8. Increased employment and improved rural livelihoods
9. Increased diﬀerentiation or competitiveness as a “brand” especially if the characteristics are likely not
reproducible elsewhere hence reducing substitutability
10. Coalesced/United and strengthened local governance
Adapted from (Galtier et al., 2008, 2013; Giovannucci et al., 2009)
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based on characteristics that goods possess rather than the entire good per se
(Lancaster, 1966; Louviere et al., 2003).
To model the heterogeneity that exists among the sampled producers for each
study site, the random parameters logit model was used (Greene, 2016; Hensheron.2019.e01218
ors. Published by Elsevier Ltd. This is an open access article under the CC BY-NC-ND license
censes/by-nc-nd/4.0/).
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follows:
An individual i (i¼ 1, 2.I) faces a choice amongst j alternatives in each of T choice
scenarios and is assumed to choose the alternative with the highest utility, having
considered a full set of presented alternatives in the choice scenario t. The mixed
logit model hence takes the following formulation:
Uijt ¼ aj þ b0ixijt þ g0zit þ εijt ð1Þ
Where bi are individual random speciﬁc utility parameters; g are individual param-
eters, which are ﬁxed for all individuals within a choice set; εijt is a parameter vector
that is randomly distributed across individuals, i.e. unobserved random disturbances
that result in unobserved heterogeneity.
Following Louviere et al. (2003), the probability that an individual chooses alterna-
tive j is given by:
Prob½choice jji; t;bi ¼
exp

aj þ b0ixijt þ g0zit

PJt
j¼1exp

aj þ b0ixijt þ g0zit
 ð2Þ
The mixed logit analysis estimates the impact of the selected attributes on the pro-
ducers’ preference formation following Hensher et al. (2015). The cost variable
was the normalising variable to determine the WTP while McFadden’s r2 measured
the overall ﬁt of the model (Birol et al., 2006; Greene, 2016; Louviere et al., 2003).
The parameter estimates of each of the attributes (bx) and the estimates of the cost
attribute (by) were used to derive the producers economic value in terms of monetary
value the farmers’ are willing to pay to register their products as GIs. The following
formulation was used to derive the producer willingness to pay value (W):
W¼bx

by
 ð3Þ
2.2. Choice experiment design
The choice experiments were part of a detailed household survey, where sampling
was random at population level. The attributes and their levels (Table 2) were deter-
mined through literature search, focus group discussions and key informant inter-
views (Oh et al., 2005; Otieno et al., 2011; Ruto and Garrod, 2009). Attributes
were identiﬁed and classiﬁed as either compulsory or optional for the respective
product value chain to be registered as a geographical indication. Producers can
only make their choice based on those that are optional. Therefore, attributes related
to environmentally sustainable practices, good agricultural practices, animal health,
were not included as part of the choice experiments. The attributes used in the choice
experiments were therefore (Table 2):on.2019.e01218
ors. Published by Elsevier Ltd. This is an open access article under the CC BY-NC-ND license
censes/by-nc-nd/4.0/).
Table 2. Attributes and levels for choice experiment for the two study products.
Attribute Levels assumed for each attribute Products for which
attribute applies
Goats Mango
Collective marketing (CMKT) 0 ¼ No collective marketing
1 ¼ Collective marketing
Yes Yes
Contractual arrangements with
buyers (CONTRACT)
(Qualitative)
0 ¼ None/Informal/Short term contracts
1 ¼ Formal/Long term contracts
Yes Yes
Where to sell (WhereSELL) 0 ¼ Directly to traders
1 ¼ To designated abattoirs
Yes N/A
Preferred group size
(GRPSIZE)
0 ¼ No groups (producer join association
individually)
1 ¼ Small groups (less than 70 members)
[Sm_GrpSize]
2 ¼ Large groups (more than 70 members)
[Lg_GrpSize]
Yes N/A
Expected price information
received at beginning of
season (ExPRICE)
0 ¼ No prior expected price information
received [NoExPrice]
1 ¼ Information on expected prices
received prior to sale [ExPriceSell]
2 ¼ Information on expected prices
received beginning of season [ExPriceSeas]
N/A Yes
Minimum guaranteed return
(MGR)
0 ¼ No minimum guaranteed price
(rely on markets)
1 ¼ Minimum guaranteed price received
N/A Yes
Preferred level of GI protection
(PrLEV)
0 ¼ No protection (Retain current)
[CurrentPrtLvl]
1 ¼ County level CountyPrtLvl]
2 ¼ Regional level [RegPrtLvl]
N/A Yes
Cost of maintaining the
Protection (COST)
(KES/HH/year)
Kenya Shillings (KES) to be paid by
each household each year [100 KES
appx z 1USD]
100
500
1200
50
100
200
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ducers pay to access various services, when need be. The amount, KES 1,200 (USD
12) is the price of one kid. Among the mango producers, the maximum cost KES 200
(USD 2) is equivalent to the amount they pay for group subscription or access to
value addition services. Each choice set had three alternatives comprising a pairwise
combination of the orthogonal proﬁles (related to diﬀerent levels of GI related attri-
butes), and an opt-out alternative, which represented the status quo. The individuals
were required to make a choice based on the ﬁrst two alternatives, and if none was
preferred, they opted for the status quo (which was the reference alternative) (Rose
et al., 2014). Two alternatives reduce the problem of information overabundance that
would inﬂuence respondents choice when faced by too many alternatives (Chung
et al., 2011).
Following Rose et al. (2014), thirty six orthogonal choice sets organised in six
blocks of six (6) sets each were developed using NGENE 1.1.2 software. Each seton.2019.e01218
ors. Published by Elsevier Ltd. This is an open access article under the CC BY-NC-ND license
censes/by-nc-nd/4.0/).
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randomly selected respondents in the respective study area. Using NLOGIT 5, co-
eﬃcients for the attributes in each of the studies were determined and used to
develop 24 eﬃcient choice sets in the NGENE 1.1.2 software, with a d-error of
0.14 and 0.07 for goats and mangoes analyse respectively.
The eﬃcient choice sets were organised in six blocks of four (4) sets each, and J ¼ 3
alternatives (scenarios). Each respondent in the study was presented with a series of
T ¼ 4 eﬃcient choice sets. Table 3 provides an example of a choice scenario pre-
sented to respondents in the goat production region of Baringo County.2.3. Study sites and sample size
The study was conducted in semi-arid regions of two counties within Kenya, Bar-
ingo in the North Rift for goat production (n ¼ 135) and Makueni in the lower
Eastern for mango production (n ¼ 137). Apple mangoes were speciﬁcally selected
for this study based on feedback from traders, although geographical indications are
about the region of production and not the variety. The semi-arid regions are char-
acterised by fragile ecosystems, low rainfall and crop productivity. Whereas the
export market for Kenyan goat meat prefers meat from young goats, producers in
Baringo do not sell their goats young. Characterised by strong cultural linkages,
they keep the goats as a sign of wealth and only sell them when in ﬁnancial need
or in case of a severe drought. In Makueni, mango production season lasts between
November and March, starting as early as September in some parts of the County
where irrigation is practiced. The short harvesting season, with peak production last-
ing between late December and February, is characterised by low producer prices
and low bargaining power due to lack of eﬀective collective action (USAID-
KAVES, 2015). These study sites and potential GI products were selected basedTable 3. An example of a choice set presented to respondents in Baringo County
(Block 6, Scenario 4).
Attribute Alternative A Alternative B Alternative C
(Status quo)
Where to sell goat meat Directly to traders To designated abattoirs Directly to traders
Mode of market access Each producer sells
on their own
Collective marketing Each producer sells
on their own
Preferred size of group to
join GI producer association
Large groups (more
than 70 members)
Small-medium groups
(15e70 members)
No group (producer
joins on their own)
Contracts with buyers Formal/long term
contracts
No contracts/informal/
short-term contracts
No contracts/informal/
short-term contracts
Cost of registering/maintaining
the GI (KES/HH/year)
KES.500 KES.1200 KES.100
I prefer alternative: , , ,
on.2019.e01218
ors. Published by Elsevier Ltd. This is an open access article under the CC BY-NC-ND license
censes/by-nc-nd/4.0/).
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Giovannucci et al., 2009; Vandecandelaere et al., 2010).
Collective action is low among the goat producers, with most of it revolving around
setting the selling price. Current regulations relate to grazing and prices, the latter of
which many producers do not enforce especially since they sell the goats when in
ﬁnancial need. The goats browse on communal ﬁelds covered with various herbs
and shrubs and the soils provide natural salt licks all of which combine to give
the unique taste in the goat meat.
Among mango producers, collective action at the time of study was strong in relation
to production and weak in marketing. The Horticultural Crops Directorate and the
Ministry of Agriculture provide advice on good agricultural practices governing
mango production. The establishment of a mango-processing factory in the County
is deemed to contribute to improved collective marketing. However, there still exists
the fresh fruit market in urban regions, which brokers often use to exploit the
producers.2.4. Data collection and analysis
The choice experiment and household survey were conducted between June and
August 2015. Based on the results of literature review and key informant interviews,
GIS mapping was used to delineate the goat and mango production regions. A sam-
pling frame comprising the respective commodity producers was developed and
sampling was randomly done within each sub-county. The producers were mainly
small scale in nature. Data was analysed using Limdep/Nlogit version 6.0. The utility
parameters for all the attributes presented to the respondents were deﬁned as random
parameters with an assumed normal distribution. The cost attribute was speciﬁed as
ﬁxed in the random parameter model speciﬁcation to enable derivation of the WTP
distribution (Revelt and Train, 1998). The models were estimated using maximum
simulated likelihood procedures of the random parameters logit with 100 Halton
draws for the simulations following Hensher et al. (2015).3. Results and discussions
3.1. Socio-economic characteristics of the households
The mean ages of the household heads were approximately 46 years and 52 years
among goat and mango producers respectively, with at least 85% of the households
being male-headed. The average number of years spent in formal education was be-
tween 9.5 years in Baringo and 10.7 years inMakueni counties respectively (Table 4).
Once they understood the GI concept, at least 84% of the producers in both study
counties indicated their willingness to contribute for GI protection. At least 45%on.2019.e01218
ors. Published by Elsevier Ltd. This is an open access article under the CC BY-NC-ND license
censes/by-nc-nd/4.0/).
Table 4. Socio-economic characteristics of the household heads (HHH).
Socio-economic characteristic Goats Apple mango
Age of HHH (in years)
(std. error in brackets)
46.4 (16.7) 52.4 (14.0)
Male headed households 91% 85%
Household accessing extension services 47% 68%
Aware of their products uniqueness 93% 85%
HHH formal education (in years)
(std. error in brackets)
9.5 (10.3) 10.7 (4.4)
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were providing credible source of information.3.2. Random parameter model estimates
The maximum likelihood estimates for the mixed logit models for each of the poten-
tial GI commodities are presented on Table 5 and Table 6. The cost attributes for all
commodities had the expected negative sign that were also signiﬁcant. Further, the
standard deviation of at least four and two of the coeﬃcients for mango and goat an-
alyses were signiﬁcant, thus giving evidence of preference heterogeneity around the
mean for the parameters at 95% conﬁdence level (Johns et al., 2008).
Receiving price information at the beginning of the season, having a county level
protection and having minimum guaranteed return were the variables that had theTable 5. Coeﬃcients and distributions of random parameter logit estimates for
the utility functions of mango attributes.
Parameters Coeﬃcient± Std. Dev. of coeﬀ±
Receive expected price beginning of season 2.472*** (0.807) 1.162 (0.720)
Receive expected price at selling time 1.835 (1.294) 2.289* (1.211)
Minimum guaranteed return 2.264*** (0.477) 1.860*** (0.540)
County level protection 2.440*** (0.875) 1.944* (1.168)
Regional level protection 0.289 (0.726) 2.698*** (0.649)
Collective marketing 2.043*** (0.386) 1.317*** (0.411)
Contracts 0.677** (0.327) 2.450*** (0.135)
COST -0.006*** (0.002)
McFadden R2 adjusted 0.429
Log-likelihood -313.4
Chi square 471.8***
***, **, * denotes signiﬁcance at 1%, 5%, 10% level.
standard error in brackets.
on.2019.e01218
ors. Published by Elsevier Ltd. This is an open access article under the CC BY-NC-ND license
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Table 6. Coeﬃcients and distributions of random parameter logit estimates for
the utility functions of goats attributes.
Parameters Coeﬃcient± Std. Dev. of coeﬀ±
Collective marketing 0.499*** (0.154) 0.100 (0.262)
Contracts 0.625*** (0.149) 0.403 (0.258)
Small group size 0.195 (0.232) 0.958** (0.463)
Large group size 0.496** (0.227) 1.827*** (0.337)
Where to sell 0.847*** (0.167) 0.682 (0.187)
COST -0.002*** (0.000)
McFadden R2 adjusted 0.168
Log-likelihood -497.5
Chi square 200.3***
***, **, * denotes signiﬁcance at 1%, 5%, 10% level.
standard error in brackets.
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traders was the least considered attribute when the respondents were making their
choices (Table 5).
TheRPLmodel coeﬃcients for goatmeat producerswere signiﬁcantwith the exception
of small group size as a preferred mode of organisation under GI protection. The attri-
butes relating to group size and selling to abattoir were sources of heterogeneity among
the producers. During the focus group discussions, it was evident that most of the goat
keepers preferred not being in groups. However, although not a requirement for GI pro-
tection, enforcement of the registration and providing collective reputation to themarket
requires there to be collective action among the producers. In this case, the goat pro-
ducers preferred to be organised in large groups of more than 70 persons. Selling the
goats to an abattoir (where to sell) and having contracts with buyers were the attributes
that inﬂuenced the choices by the goat keepers (producers) most (Table 6).3.3. Producers’ valuation (willingness to pay) for GI related
attributes
The producers’ willingness-to-pay results are based on the WALD test using Delta
method and they show the signiﬁcance of the WTP based on the Z-statistics. The
mango producers had a higher willingness to pay for price related variables
compared to those related to the region of protection and collective action (Table 7).
Goat producers attached most value to being able to sell their goats at an abattoir
(where to sell) followed by having contracts with the buyers of goat meat. During
the focus group discussions, the goat producers indicated that goats are a sign of
wealth and they only sell when in need of ﬁnances and they do not engage in selling
young goats. Due to over-supply during peak selling seasons, the prices drop.on.2019.e01218
ors. Published by Elsevier Ltd. This is an open access article under the CC BY-NC-ND license
censes/by-nc-nd/4.0/).
Table 7. Producers’ willingness to pay for GI attributes for the attributes of the
two commodities.
Mango Goats
Receive price info beginning of season 399.3*** (122e676)
Receive price info at selling 296.4 (-80e673)
Minimum guaranteed return 365.8*** (98e633)
County level protection 394.2* (-19e808)
Regional level protection 46.6 (-197e290)
Collective marketing 330.0*** (93e567) 207.3*** (86.2e328.3)
Contracts with buyers 109.3* (-4e223) 259.6*** (125.2e394.0)
GI registration through small groups 80.9 (104e266)
GI registration through large groups 206.1** (16.6e395.6)
Where to sell 351.7*** (208e495)
Total WTP 1,598.6 1,024.7
**,*** - signiﬁcant at 95% and 99% level of signiﬁcance.
Blank cells indicate the attribute was not part of the respective product analysis (95% conﬁdence interval
in brackets).
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tracts could also deny producers higher prices in future time that is still within the
contract period. However, the contracts as well as formalised selling point increase
excludability for the unique potential GI product.
When asked how much the producers would willingly contribute towards protection
of their unique products with GI, the total WTP derived for the attributes on Table 7
is higher than what some of the producers were individually willing to pay. This
therefore points to the fact that GI protection and its voluntary nature can lead to
exclusion of producers within the study region. The disadvantage this poses is
that traders and consumers are able to access the unique product from within the
study region but a lower price from the non-participating producers. This is espe-
cially so if there is no distinguishing characteristic of the products and the value/ben-
eﬁts that accrue to members of the GI protection do not equal or exceed the
membership payments (Thiedig and Sylvander, 2000). The region of production
provides a public good and not a private good, hence any producer in the region
is capable of having the same quality product.
From the analysis, producers’ willingness to pay for collective marketing for both
products was KES 330 (USD 3.3) and KES 207 (USD 2.07) for mango and goat
respectively (Table 7). Collective action is a major aspect for the success of GI pro-
tection (Barjolle and Sylvander, 2000; Reviron and Chappuis, 2011). By engaging in
collective marketing, the producers present a joint product to the market, hence es-
tablishing exclusion and exclusion costs restricted to the production region, making
it a private good. Collective marketing will aﬀect the current supply chain and, ifon.2019.e01218
ors. Published by Elsevier Ltd. This is an open access article under the CC BY-NC-ND license
censes/by-nc-nd/4.0/).
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ensuring lasting reputation of the product.
Receiving expected price at the beginning of the season and having minimum guar-
anteed return/price were the two most valued attributes among the mango producers
that would motivate them to participate in GI protection. In Kibwezi East sub-county
in the mango study region, the producers were able to get at least USD 0.6 (KES.60)
per piece of mango sold to exporters compared to USD 0.05 (KES 3) when selling to
traders from the local markets. Having the price information at the beginning of the
season (combined with contracting) is an incentive to producers to manage the prod-
uct and its reputation sustainably. A GI registration would ensure little or no rivalry
of prices within the production region. However, if membership increases due to the
absence of rivalry, production is likely to increase and this could in turn result in
reduced prices for the members in the long-term.4. Conclusions
The study undertook to determine the producers’ willingness to pay for registration
and protection of diﬀerent unique products in semi-arid regions of Kenya with
geographical indications. The producers valued market-related attributes higher
compared to those related to protection of their products. The protection should
necessarily provide the market-related attributes considered important by the pro-
ducers. These assure the producers of deﬁned markets and prices that have a level
of guarantee over time. Using geographical indications protection would provide
the producers with an opportunity to delimit the production region responsible
for the unique product characteristics. This in turn increases the value derived
from their products, while at the same time providing consumers with information
needed to make the choice of purchasing the product agreeing with previous obser-
vation by Galtier et al. (2013). In a study determining producer perceptions towards
GI protection, the producers of goat meat highlighted the importance of environ-
mental and institutional attributes. These included managing the environment for
sustainability, having better market access and prices as well as the role of policies
and institutions in ensuring the success of the registration, hence informing their
willingness to pay.
The apple mango producers exhibited strong preference for price related attributes
while goat producers exhibited strong preference for attributes related to the mode
of selling (i.e. where to sell, contracts with traders and collective marketing). Goat
producers revealed strong preference for the mode of sell of the GI product as
well as how (contract marketing).
As opposed to protecting the products with collective marks, where an individual or
group owns the mark, geographical indications give collective rights to all producerson.2019.e01218
ors. Published by Elsevier Ltd. This is an open access article under the CC BY-NC-ND license
censes/by-nc-nd/4.0/).
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tion using either collective or certiﬁcation trademarks. However, collective marks
would serve like a club good, as it has exclusivity on attaining the maximum number
of participants. Certiﬁcation mark on the other hand, especially where owned by a
State department, would provide an eﬀective way of enforcing the codes of practice.
However, although all three are associated with protection of reputation as well as
market distinctiveness (da Silva and Peralta, 2011), certiﬁcation and collective trade-
marks would not necessarily attribute the product quality to the characteristics of a
given production region, the essence of geographical indication protection. Espe-
cially considering the fact that the producers are mainly smallscale, a sui generis
geographical indications law in Kenya would hence be a more appropriate protection
compared to the current use of trademarks. Trademarks as currently drawn up do not
provide for speciﬁcity of the product based on the region of production and would pit
the less resource-endowed producers at a disadvantage as richer producers beneﬁt
from the trademarks.Declarations
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